Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly.
Introduction
Ever since their inception, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been accused of being a tool of their major shareholders, and especially the US.
1 Woods (2003) clearly documents that the US virtually controls major decisions at IMF and World Bank; Fratianni and Pattison (2003) summarize evidence showing that the G7 are in full control of the IMF on the big issues and that staff autonomy is restricted to areas which are of marginal interest to its shareholders. In the words of Rieffel (2003: 28-29) , "The IMF is an instrument of the G-7 countries. There is no example that comes easily to mind of a position taken by the IMF on any systematic issue without the tacit, if not explicit, support of the United States and the other G-7 countries." 2 The recent empirical literature on political influences on the IMF shows that developing countries indeed get better terms from the IMF, when they have closer ties with the US, as measured by their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Thacker 1999, Barro and Lee 2005 , Stone 2002 , Vreeland, 2005 , Dreher and Jensen 2007 . Similarly, the US interferes with World Bank policies when its national interests are at stake (Gwin 1997 ). Schoulz (1982) documents that the US frequently influences the World Bank's "interests" in certain loans. In some cases, the Bank even violated its charter to satisfy US politicians. Consequently, Frey and Schneider (1986) find the distribution of Bank loans to be dominated by political considerations; Fleck and Kilby (2001) show that World Bank lending significantly reflects US influence. More recently, Faini and Grilli (2004) report that World Bank (and IMF) lending is influenced by US and EU.
However, while there is ample evidence that the G7 countries control the flow of IMF and World Bank money, it has never been investigated whether the recipients of this money adapt their behavior to please the keepers of the funds. This is the question our paper deals with. Specifically, we investigate empirically whether IMF and World Bank involvement increases the probability that a country votes in line with G7 countries in the UN General
Assembly.
The question addressed here is related to the literature on the impact of bilateral aid on UN General Assembly voting patterns. A number of previous studies investigate this question 3 (see section 2). Clearly, as compared to the Security Council, the power of the General Assembly is limited, and not all of its decisions are likely to be important for G7 countries.
Still, there is ample evidence that G7 governments place some weight on the outcome of General Assembly votes. This is particularly true for the US. As has been pointed out by the US Department of State (1985) , examining UN votes makes it possible "to make judgments about whose values and views are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently opposed to ours, and whose practices fall in between." A report from the same department in 2000 states "a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors" (quoted in Barnebeck Andersen, Harr and Tarp 2004: 15) . It has been argued that the "State Department … places high value on the employment of foreign aid to … swing critical votes in international bodies" (Black 1968: 19) . Thacker (1999: 54) cites a memo to the director of the Food for Peace Program noting that "at critical moments in the world's recent history, the U.S. 'bought' votes subtly and indirectly to support its stand in the General Assembly." Bennis (1997) claims that "U.S. influence in (and often control of) the UN comes in the form of coercing the organization to take one or another position, or to reject some other position, or pressuring a country or countries to vote a certain way in the General Assembly." As a specific example of US pressure on the Assembly,
Bennis describes the US effort to overturning the 1975 resolution identifying political
Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. According to Bennis, "U.S. diplomats took off, criss-crossing the globe using Gulf War-tested methods of bribing and threatening other nations to win support for the repeal effort."
Overall, there is reason to believe that aid is not only given to help countries in economic distress but to achieve the donor's political targets. In fact, since the late 1940s every US administration considered foreign aid to be important in achieving foreign policy goals (Ruttan 1996) . It has even been claimed that the primary purpose of US economic assistance is in promoting overall US policy objectives (Zimmerman 1993) . According to Morgenthau (1962: 302) , "the transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered."
In summary, G7 countries are in control of IMF and Bank decisions, and can thereby use the international organizations to bribe or reward recipient countries. Moreover, G7
countries place some weight on General Assembly votes and there is also evidence that certain states in the Assembly are very susceptible to pressure (Keohane 1966) . We therefore expect Fund and Bank involvement to influence voting patterns in the Assembly.
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Our paper combines two strands of the literature and extends previous work on foreign aid and voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. As previous empirical studies did not cover extended periods of time, are inconclusive, and usually focus on US influences only, the analysis of foreign aid on voting patterns is interesting in its own right. However, the main contribution of this paper is to analyze for the first time, whether G7 countries employ the IMF and the World Bank to change the voting behavior of developing countries (or reward countries for voting with them). What we find is, basically, that IMF and World Bank indeed influence voting behavior in the Assembly. Countries with IMF and World Bank programs tend to vote more frequently in line with the G7 countries. The same is true for countries receiving larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank. We employ Extreme Bounds
Analysis to test for the robustness of our results. While the basic results for IMF and World
Bank hold, bilateral aid from G7 countries is not robustly related to voting in the General
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a short overview of previous empirical work on bilateral and multilateral aid, and voting in the UN General
Assembly. The third section discusses methodological issues. The fourth develops our hypotheses, whereas the fifth describes the data. In the sixth section we present the results of our analysis, while we discuss variations to our estimation approach in section seven. Finally, we provide a short summary.
Literature Review
The relevant literature can be divided in two parts. One studies the impact of voting on IMF and World Bank behavior; the other investigates the impact of foreign aid on voting.
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On the first point, Thacker (1999) was the first to test the hypothesis that conclusion of IMF programs depends on countries' voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. He employs two variables -one indicating a country's political agreement with the US, the other reflecting movement in political alignment. According to his results for the period 1985-94, political proximity has no statistically significant impact when serial correlation is taken into 3 The literature on the determinants of voting decisions is not confined to the UN General Assembly. Levitt (1996) and Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) , e.g., analyze voting patterns in the US Congress. Boockmann (2003) looks at voting in the International Labour Organization, the focus of Eldar (2004) 4 Similarly, Alesina and Dollar (2000) analyze the impact of voting on bilateral aid. Results from their panel analysis show that countries voting with Japan receive more bilateral aid, while voting with the US has no impact when controlled for US interests in the Middle East. Voting with other major donor countries has no impact. Other papers examining the impact of voting in the UN General Assembly on bilateral aid include Ball and Johnson (1996) , Boschini and Olofsgard (2001) , Alesina and Weder (2002) , and Fleck and Kilby (2005) .
Kilby (2006) employs UN voting patterns in his analysis of donor influence on the Asian Development Bank.
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[Insert Table 1 about here] The second question, the impact of foreign aid on voting, has also received much attention. Table 1 summarizes the main results of those studies. As can be seen, empirical findings are, however, inconclusive. Some studies conclude that aid is ineffective in influencing voting behavior, while others find the expected positive relation between bilateral aid and voting similarity.
With respect to the US, Kato (1969) , Kegley and Hook (1991) , Sexton and Decker (1992) and Morey and Lai (2003) belong to the first group. Bernstein and Alpert (1971 ), Rai (1972 , 1980 ), Wittkopf (1973 , Lundborg (1998) and Wang (1999) Latin American votes is much higher. Russett (1967) , employing factor analysis, shows that regional clusters are most important for voting alignment. According to Kim and Russett (1996) Wittkopf (1973), Sexton and Decker (1992) and Barro and Lee (2005) employed the fraction of times a country votes the same as the country of interest (either both voting yes, both voting no, both voting abstentions, or both being absent), Kegley and Hoock (1991) simply discarded abstentions or absences. 7 In any case, the resulting numbers are then divided by the total number of votes in each year. We concentrate on the method proposed by Thacker (1999) for both theoretical and statistical reasons. The difference between the three approaches lies in the way they weigh abstentions or absences, giving it a weight of 0, 0.5 or 1 in case the potential donor country does vote. Of course, any of these weights is arbitrary, but we prefer not opting for a corner solution and hence stick to the definition of Thacker (1999) in which a weight of 0.5 is used. Furthermore, from a statistical point of view this produces a dependent variable with a nicely bell-shaped distribution (as opposed to the other two definitions where the tails of the distribution do become rather fat). Hence, it is less likely that our results will be driven by extreme observations. Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our results by also employing the methods of Kegley and Hoock (1991) and Barro and Lee (2005) .
In addition to the data based on voting behavior in the same year only -as is the case with the above three definitions -we also calculate a moving average of the dependent variable. It is quite likely that proximity to the G7 countries only evolves slowly over time, and voting behavior of previous years might therefore give important information about a 6 Similarly, Gartzke and Jo (2002) and Morey and Lai (2003) code voting coincidence between -1 and 1, with abstentions being in between compliance and non-compliance. Russett (1967) and Rai (1972) code each country either 2 (yes), 1 (abstain or absent), or 0 (negative). Focusing on abstentions might be important as donors might bribe governments not only to comply, but also to avoid non-compliance (Zimmermann 1993 , Palmer et al. 2002 , Hawes 2004 . 7 Yet an alternative method has been suggested by Brams and O'Leary (1970) Clearly, the amount of effort a country puts on influencing others will depend on the importance of a vote. It has been pointed out in the introduction that not all votes in the General Assembly are likely to be of great importance to the US and other G7 countries.
Focusing the analysis on a sub-set of votes might thus be superior. However, inclusion of all votes has also been defended. Wittkopf (1973) only. Our study deals with a broader range of countries and a longer period of time . Nevertheless, we provide an analysis employing only key votes for comparison.
Some of the previous studies exclude nearly unanimous votes, as it is unlikely that countries bribe on those. Clearly, however, the threshold above which votes are to be excluded is purely subjective. In our robustness tests we discard votes where more than 80 percent of the countries agreed on the outcome.
Voting alignment is also likely to depend on the underlying topic. [Insert Table 2 about here]
The bottom row of Table 2 reports the number of observations available for the various dependent variables in case we focus on an artificially constructed G7 donor country (see below). The correlation coefficients -after having corrected for both recipient-countryand time-specific effects -are in the upper part. Our annualized sample of up to 188 countries covering 1970-2002 includes around 5'000 observations. Only in case we concentrate on US key votes, the number of country-years drops to about 3'300.
Overall, the correlations among most of the various definitions are rather high.
Excluding nearly unanimous votes from any of the three baseline definitions, i.e. Thacker, Barro-Lee or Kegley-Hoock, leads to a correlation of 0.96 or above. Correlation of the moving average versions with these three definitions also always exceeds 0.9. Even leaving out Israeli topics hardly affects voting coincidence; the correlation coefficient is at least 0.95.
Hence, it is rather unlikely that our results will depend on issues like these. Nevertheless, we return to this below.
It is more likely that our results will depend on focusing on key votes only, and on how we include abstentions and absences. The correlation between the three baseline definitions and the same definitions including only US key votes is still high, however, amounting to roughly 0.7. This is in line with the results of Voeten (2000), showing that a country's position in the Assembly is independent of the importance of the issues.
The lowest correlations are found between the three ways of dealing with abstentions or absences. For instance, the correlation between our main voting index according to the definition of Thacker and those according to the definition of Kegley and Hook is only 0.54.
It will thus be important to test for the robustness of our findings using these alternative definitions as to deal with abstentions or absences.
9 Other topics which received relatively large attention in the UN General Assembly include 'apartheid', 'arms' and 'nuclear power'. However, each of these took a share of only 9 percent in total voting. Results do not appear to be driven by one of these specific topics.
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The next issue concerns choosing the relevant donor country (or vote of reference) for a recipient country. The literature assumes preferences of G7 countries to be sufficiently homogenous to attribute domination of IMF and World Bank to this group (Bird and Rowlands 2001) . Most of the literature focuses on the US as the potential donor. However, measuring voting compliance with only the US or each G7 country individually might bias the results of the empirical analysis against finding support for the political pressure hypothesis. As the G7 countries rarely all vote in line among themselves, their individual pressure on the international organizations might neutralize them. As one example, there is evidence that France was trying to buy votes (in the Security Council) in order to oppose the Second Gulf War, while the US was paying for support (Eldar 2004) . Another case in point is the contested bid by Germany and Japan to become permanent members of the UN Security
Council, which has been opposed by other members of the Security Council. To take this into account, we do not only analyze compliance with each G7 country individually, but also construct a variable reflecting the average vote of the G7 countries. 10 This has been done by Barro and Lee (2005) for France, Germany and the UK, and by Neumayer (2003) for all DAC donors. We weigh each G7 countries' vote with its quota in the Fund to take its voting power in the international organizations into account.
[Insert Table 3 about here] Table 3 presents the correlation of voting coincidence among G7 countries. The last column shows how voting of each G7 country according to the definition of Thacker is correlated with the "voting with the G7 countries" variable. In general, these correlations are rather high. Despite the fact that the US gets the largest weight (due to its high quota with the Fund) in our G7 average, the only exception appears to be the correlation between these two.
These findings are confirmed by the correlation coefficients between each pair of G7 countries. Again the correlation coefficients with the US are relatively low. Hence, with respect to the other six G7 members -and in particular Canada, France, the UK, and Italythere is a high degree of voting coincidence.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Again voting coincidence with the US is -independent of the region of focus -the lowest of all. With only one exception, Japan has the highest correlation with each region separately. In case of Western Europe, Japan is surpassed by both Canada and Italy.
Towards a baseline model
The main question we address in this paper is whether or not IMF and World Bank programs and loans affect the voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. To answer that, we face several problems.
One of the main challenges in empirical analysis when there is no established benchmark is coming up with a reliable model. We employ a general-to-specific method to construct such a baseline model. In selecting potential variables for this baseline we employ a number of hypotheses put forward in the literature with respect to voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly. Once the baseline model is determined, we concentrate on testing our main hypotheses (Section 5).
Hypotheses for the baseline model
Hagan (1989) has pointed out that the political direction of governments might be important for voting in the UN General Assembly. Socialist countries are probably likely to share similar views on a range of topics. The same is true for central or right-wing governments. In addition to political proximity, a similar culture might lead to similar voting behavior (for a discussion of the argument see Voeten 2000). Particularly, Thacker (1999) has pointed out that, as countries become more democratic, they may also alter their UN voting behavior to reflect these changes. Democracies rarely fight wars against each other (Doyle 1986 ) and probably have interests closer to the G7 countries than dictatorships do. They agree, e.g., on principles like free speech, private property and elected representation (Wang 1999) and might thus form an alliance of liberal democracies against more dictatorial regimes.
Voeten (2000) provides empirical evidence. According to his results, the Western-
Non-Western dimension is most important in explaining voting behavior in the General
Assembly -with Western countries being democracies and Non-Western countries mostly being non-democratic for the major part of the sample period.
Hypothesis 1: Cultural and political proximity increases voting coincidence.
We measure cultural and political proximity with the G7 countries with an index of political rights and civil liberties, the change of that index, the rule of law, perceived corruption and bureaucratic quality. 11 We also include a dummy that is one if a country's government has the same political color as the respective G7 country, i.e. both are either leftor right-wing governments.
A country's economic and political strength and its access to alternative capital sources might also be important for voting behavior. Arguably, politically and economically strong countries with easy access to private capital are less likely to accept bribes and are thus less likely to vote in line with G7 countries. Dependence might be higher in times of crises and political instability, or when private capital is less freely flowing in general. Highly indebted countries frequently have no alternative to IMF and World Bank loans, increasing their dependence.
Natural resources and other potential revenues decrease dependence:
Hypothesis 2: Countries depending on foreign support are more likely to vote in line with G7 countries.
We employ a number of variables to proxy for dependence on foreign support: total aid received (in percent of GNI); the change in total received aid; a composite indicator of national capability; total external debt (in percent of GDP); the change in total external debt; a variable measuring ethnic tensions; the rate of inflation; current account balance (in percent of GDP); overall budget balance (in percent of GDP); GDP per capita; and real GDP growth. (Stone 2003) , and the same is true for foreign direct investment. Economic ties might thus increase the probability of voting with the partner country.
However, strong economic ties with developed countries might as well create feelings of exploitation and could thus give rise to voting against these countries (Kim and Russett 1996) . The impact of trade and foreign direct investment on voting patterns is thus a priori ambiguous:
Hypothesis 3a: Trade flows and FDI increase the probability that a country votes in line with its partner country.
Hypothesis 3b: Trade flows and FDI reduce the probability that a country votes in line with its partner country.
These hypotheses are tested with exports and imports from the respective G7 country (in percent of GDP). Unfortunately, we cannot test for the impact of bilateral inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment, as inclusion of those variables would reduce the sample size well below 30 countries.
The literature review of the previous section gives raise to in particular one additional hypothesis regarding the determinants of countries' voting behavior in the UN General
Assembly which is related to our main hypothesis. This final hypothesis is directly derived from this literature:
Hypothesis 4: Bilateral foreign aid, or changes in aid, increases the probability that a recipient country votes in line with the donor.
We employ net grants (in percent of GDP) from the respective G7 country and the changes thereof to test whether bilateral aid impacts on voting behavior.
13 13 We also included loans by the respective G7 country or countries and food aid, but did not have a sufficient number of observations for meaningful regression analysis. 
Selection of the baseline model
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis (with yearly data). The analysis covers the time period 1970-2002 and extends to a maximum of 188 countries for our dependent variable. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. We find significant fixed country and time effects in most specifications and therefore include them in our regressions. (However, the coefficients of the country and time dummies are not reported in the tables.) As a consequence, we cannot include variables that do not change over time or are the same for all countries.
14 In our first step of coming up with a suitable baseline model we apply a general-tospecific procedure. We include all variables derived from the hypotheses formulated above and then delete that variable with the lowest level of significance. With the remaining variables, this procedure is repeated until all coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level.
In a second step we check whether any of the previously deleted variables would render significant when added again. These significant variables are step by step included. The two steps are repeated until a final model converges.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
As was to be expected, the results of this procedure are to a certain extent donorcountry specific. Table 5 shows that we do have some evidence in favor of the first three of our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 on cultural and political proximity appears to be mainly backed up by our measure of democracy. More democratic societies tend to vote in line with G7 countries. A number of times we also find significant effects of the political color variable and corruption. Changes in democracy and bureaucratic quality each only matter for one particular donor country (Japan and, respectively, Germany).
With respect to hypothesis 2, we find very strong evidence that national capability lowers the probability of a country to vote in line with any of the G7 members. Note that this composite indicator of national capability is a measure of power based upon six indicators:
military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. Hence, as expected, countries which score high on this composite indicator are likely to be less dependent on foreign relationships and will therefore vote in a more autonomous manner. Also, a large budget deficit increases voting coincidence for a number of donor countries. External debt, inflation, GDP per capita and GDP growth only occasionally enter the regressions with a significant coefficient. With the exception of inflation, the results confirm that aid dependence increases voting coincidence, supporting our a priori hypothesis. Note that variables related to our other hypotheses, like (change in) total aid received (in percent of GNI), change in external debt or ethnic tension, are not selected by this general-to-specific approach.
For the relevance of bilateral trade flows we find some support for the hypothesis that countries exporting to a donor country vote more in line with the donor. Only in case of Italy, countries importing from it vote more in line with Italy as well. There is thus no evidence that economic ties create feelings of exploitation, creating resentment against the trading partner, and leading to votes against the partner. The positive effects of interdependence clearly dominate here. Table 5 shows that the determinants of voting coincidence differ across countries.
However, for ease of comparison we prefer to have the same baseline model for all countries.
Given that the evidence in Table 5 is in particular clear for our measures of democracy and national capability, we include these two variables in our baseline model.
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[Insert Table 6 about here] Table 6 
Main hypothesis
There is ample evidence that G7 countries, and in particular the US, bribe governments to vote in line in the General Assembly. As outlined above, G7 countries are in control of IMF and Bank decisions, and can thereby use the international organizations to influence recipient countries' behavior in line with their interests. 16 The benefits of bribing governments indirectly via IMF and World Bank instead of directly with own aid programs might be substantial. It has been argued that national governments delegate unpleasant tasks they consider necessary to gain support of interest groups to international organizations ("dirty work"). This might allow governments to escape the nationalist resentment those actions would create when imposing more direct pressure (Vaubel 1986 (Vaubel , 1991 (Vaubel , 1996 . According to Eldar (2004) , votes are almost always traded behind the scenes, because most countries prefer to conceal vote trading arrangements to escape public and political condemnation. As
Harrigan, Wang and El-Said (2006) 
First results for our main hypothesis
Aid and loans might not be given to "bribe" governments, but to reward previous voting compliance. We thus have to deal with the time structure of our right-hand-side variables. As a first step we run correlation analysis allowing for a one year lead or lag in our loan and aid variables. Both the dependent and the explanatory variables are first corrected for countryand time-specific effects and for the information already contained in the baseline variables.
To account for the time structure we choose that lead or lag where the correlation with the voting coincidence variable is highest.
[Insert Table 7 about here] [Insert Table 8 about here] Table 8 Recalling the lag structure of Table 7 , our results imply that IMF non-concessional loan agreements become higher to reward countries for their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. The results imply that one year after demonstrating alliance with the G7 countries in the Assembly, the probability of receiving greater non-concessional loan arrangements is significantly higher. The opposite seems to hold for IMF flows actually disbursed and new non-concessional World Bank loans (IBRD flows), where loans seem to be disbursed to bribe countries (rather than reward them).
The baseline variables stay significant at the one percent level in all specifications.
Again, the estimated coefficients are very robust.
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[Insert Table 9 about here] To see how sensitive our results are with respect to selecting the aggregate G7 as our potential donor country, Table 9 summarizes the outcomes of similar analyses for each of the members separately. Each column summarizes a similar table as Table 8 , i.e. each cell is based upon one regression. For ease of comparison, the results for the aggregate G7 -as presented in Table 8 -are listed in the last column.
The results as described above do most of the time also hold for each G7 member.
However, there are some interesting differences. These differences mainly occur when focusing on the US. Here the IMF variables, and in particular IMF non-concessional flows, are much less important. Also, World Bank projects are overall less significant for the US.
The impact of IDA flows on voting coincidence is negative for all G7 countries except the US and UK, whereas voting with the US is significantly more likely with more money received from the IDA. While the negative impact of IDA flows on voting coincidence is surprising, the robustness analysis presented in the next section shows that these results depend on the specific specification chosen, and thus on the correlation among the IMF and World Bank variables. The US seems to be primarily using the World Bank whereas other G7 countries employ Bank and Fund alike. As a possible explanation, the World Bank President has always been American, while the Fund Managing Director has been a European. This might give the US more leverage over the Bank as compared to the Fund.
Robustness to model specification
To examine both the sensitivity of our baseline model and the coefficients of our explanatory variables of interest to changes in model specification we apply (variants) of the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) . These EBA methods will be described below. As the robustness analysis includes the donor-specific variables that are important determinants of voting behavior according to Table   5 , the potential problem of neglecting donor-specific variables in our baseline model is alleviated.
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Extreme bounds analysis
EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature. 19 The central difficulty in this research -which also applies to the research topic of the present paper -is that several different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest. Indeed, a glance at the studies summarized in Table 1 
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of 'standard' explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for β -i.e.
the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations -is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β -i.e. the highest value for β plus two standard deviations -is positive, the variable F is not robustly related to Y.
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with certainty that one model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to alternative modeling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly this. Still, the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997a , 1997b argues that the test applied in the Extreme Bounds Analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases.
If the distribution of β has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. We will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i- Martin's (1997a Martin's ( , 1997b suggestion to analyze the entire distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted parameter estimate of β and its standard deviation but also the unweighted cumulative 19 See, e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992) , Sala-i-Martin (1997a , 1997b , Temple (1998 Temple ( , 2000 , Fernández, Ley and Steel (2001) , Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) and Sturm and de Haan (2005) . 21 distribution function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero. We will base our conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA. 20 Table 10 presents the results of the Extreme Bounds Analysis for the individual G7 countries and the weighted average. 21 Besides the fixed country and time effects only national capability and the index for democracy are included in the base model (M). As explained above, the variables used to test our hypotheses have then been added to the F-vector one at a time. Using the set of 27 remaining variables (which enter the Z-vector) the above-described EBA approach is employed to get a clearer picture of the robustness of the F-variable.
EBA Results
[Insert Table 10 about here]
The left-hand side of Table 10 shows how often the particular variable testing one of our main hypothesis has been significant at the 5 percent level of significance in the close to 3'700 regressions we ran for each of them. The right-hand side of the table reports the percentage of the unweighted cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero.
Hence, Table 10 gives an overview of the statistical significance of each variable.
[Insert Table 11 about here] Table 11 , on the other hand, is useful to explore the impact of each variable on voting behavior. It reports in the first column the average value of each variable and its standard error as used in the baseline model. The next seven columns contain the average estimated coefficient (and its standard deviation). The final column reports the impact of a one standard error shock for G7 voting coincidence.
20 Sala-i-Martin (1997a) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, the varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of the variables poses a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed in this way are not equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version. Furthermore, for technical reasons -in particular our unbalanced panel setup -we are unable to use the extension of this approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) as introduced by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) .
21 See Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005) for a recent analysis regarding the determinants of IMF loans.
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As can be seen from the tables (and due to the high correlation among the dependent variables), the pattern of significant variables is fairly similar among the seven countries and their weighted average. Again the only significant differences appear to be between the US and the remaining G7 countries. Generally, voting with the G7 is robustly more likely for All this makes us confident that all G7 countries -with the exception of the US -can be well-described by a model including, besides our baseline variables, IMF non-concessional flows and programs and World Bank adjustment projects. For the US, the results point to including concessional and non-concessional flows besides the baseline variables. Table 12 reports the results of an extended model, containing these variables in addition to the baseline.
The results show that World Bank adjustment projects are no robust determinant of voting in line with the US.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
As a next step we further elaborate on this extended model. Due to space restraints, we will restrict ourselves to the last two columns of Table 12 , i.e. the US and the average G7 -as representing the other G7 member countries.
Further robustness checks to the extended model
As described above, the definition of the voting coincidence variable varied in the previous literature. We therefore test the robustness of our results to changes in this definition. We also test whether a moving average version of voting coincidence, the exclusion of non-key votes, the exclusion of almost unanimous votes or the exclusion of Israeli topics affects our results.
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There has also been some discussion about whether the end of the Cold War introduced a structural shift in countries' positions in the Assembly (see, e.g. Voeten 2000).
Arguably, the determinants of voting in the General Assembly need not be constant over the 30 years under study. The IMF's support for countries with strong ties to the US, but lacking effective reform programs, was particularly pronounced in the Cold War era (Krueger 1998, Bordo and James 2000) . Regarding the strategic importance of multilateral loans, this shift might be important. During the Cold War, pressure by both the West and the East on nonaligned countries was rather open and direct. Comparably obvious direct pressure might not be tolerated by the international community today. In addition, after the end of the Cold War countries are less constrained by alignments and might thus be more likely to vote according to their preferences when not being bribed. Particularly, economically weak countries no longer need protection by "their" bloc and now need to be bribed to achieve alignment. To capture this break, we therefore replicated the models allowing the coefficients to differ for the periods before 1991 and after 1990.
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Finally, we also replicate the analysis omitting those countries that never received IMF or, respectively, World Bank loans.
[Insert Table 13 about here] Table 13 presents the results. The first column replicates the extended model of Table   12 for the G7 and the USA. The remaining columns check the sensitivity of these results. As can be seen, using alternative dependent variables rarely changes the results for the average Harrigan, Wang and El-Said (2006) argue that the post 9/11 concerns of Western countries might intensify their willingness of employing aid as a tool of foreign policy. As Harrigan et al. remark, the US explicitly states that the War on Terror and US security are important reasons for foreign aid. They cite President G.W. Bush speaking at the UN meeting in Monterrey that "we fight poverty because hope is an answer to terror." The 2001 terrorist attacks might thus have introduced another structural break. However, as we hardly have data for the post 9/11 period, we cannot test for this.
and Kegley-Hook changes the previous result. In summary, the main results are fairly robust as to how the dependent variable is defined and which votes are included. Turning to the sensitivity of the dependent variable for the extended US-model, the results are again extremely robust to our tests. However, in contrast to the results for the average G7 country, the impact of the World Bank on voting with the US does not change over time. The coefficients of IDA and IBRD flows are smaller in the period up until 1990 as compared to the full sample, but stay significant at the five percent level.
As another important issue, clearly, the analysis so far does neglect the potential endogeneity of IMF and World Bank involvement. To deal with this, we employ the GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) . This estimator first-differences the estimating equation and uses lags of the dependent variable from at least the previous two periods as well as lags of the exogenous variables as instruments. Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, the equations are over-identified and the instruments must be appropriately weighted. We present results from the Arellano-Bond onestep estimator, which uses the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. The two-step estimator weights the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the one-step estimates. However, in limited samples like the one used here, standard errors tend to be under-estimated by the twostep estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991: 291) . In all estimations we treat the covariates as strictly exogenous. For the GMM estimator, we conduct a Sargan test on the validity of the instruments used. This amounts to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates. We also report 25 results of the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to be consistent.
[Insert Table 14 about here] Table 14 shows the results for the G7 and the US. As can be seen, most results are not qualitatively affected by the potential endogeneity of the Financial Institution variables. The exception is IMF programs that do no longer significantly determine voting with the G7. The quantitative impact of the World Bank variables decreases when those variables are instrumented -but still remain quantitatively important. The Sargan test accepts the instruments at the one percent level in both specifications. However, the Arellano-Bond test rejects the hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation. We therefore include a second lag of the dependent variable to the regressions (not reported in the table). As it turns out, both specification tests accept the instrument when the second lag is included, while the results are qualitatively unchanged.
To summarize, our results seem to be extremely robust to changes in the definition of the dependent variable, changes in the sample, and method of estimation.
Conclusion
The Regarding bilateral grants from G7 countries, our results show that there is no robust link between grants and voting in the General Assembly. Given the robust and significant impact of IMF and World Bank on voting coincidence, this is surprising. As one explanation, more money might be needed than can be provided by any individual bilateral donor alone.
We also hypothesized that G7 countries might prefer indirect pressure on other governments over direct pressure. This provides a second explanation for our results. Finally, aggregated grant flows might measure foreign influence too imprecisely. Specific categories of aid are better suited to buy political support from the recipient countries than others. Emergency relief, for example, is unlikely to be given for political reasons and might add too much noise to aggregate grant flows, hiding the potential impact on voting behavior. Analyzing the impact of disaggregated bilateral aid flows provides an avenue for future research. -6.753 -6.928 -7.412 -6.484 -6.925 -6.499 -7.896 -7.378 -7.566 (-9 .06) (-10.16) (-9.92) (-7.66) (-9.37) (-9.24) (-8.40 
